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THE ATTAIN~.· 
The assize of novel disseisin ·originally lay against the disseisor in 
possession fo favor of the disseisee, and was soon extended to the 
heir of -the disseisee, but not against the heir· or grantee of the dis-
seisor. But the disseisor might be dead or might have conveyed the 
land, and in such a case the disseisee would be driven to the writ 
. of right with its delays and chance of battle. But the cases where 
the defendant had come into possession under a lawful title which 
·· was limited in time and had ceased to exist, i.. e., cases where there 
was no disseisin except constructive but an unlawful retention of. 
possession were also wholly unprovided for. The judges and their 
clerks were busy remedying these defects, and they invented what 
came to be called writs .of entry. They were given to the claimant 
out of possession, and like the assize, the writ defined the issue. The 
writs, without noticing the Quibus, were of two kinds: (I) where 
the seisin of defendan!: in possession originated lawfully, as in cases 
of discontinuance and deforceme.nt, and ( 2) where his seisin orig-
inated unlawfully ~s in cases of abatement, intrusion and disseisin. 
All the writs defined the issue by saying that the defendant in pos-
session "has not entry except through" (non habet ingressum nisi 
per) a cer.tain person and then stated the defect in the title. 
Against the disseisor the novel d.isseisin lay. But against the 
. grantee (f oeff ee) or heir the writ was invented, assigning no entry 
except through (per) a certain person who disseised plaintiff or. his 
ancestor. Next, it was extended to the heir's or grantee's heir or 
grantee by the phrase "no entry except through" (per) a certain per-
son to whom (cui) the disseisor granted or who was the disseisor's· 
heir. Here the writs stopped; they would not go beyond the third 
party inclusive (u.sque ad tcrtiam pcrsonam inclusivam),28 accord-
ing to Bracton. The reason given was that the writ would be going 
back to a time as to which the jury could not' be expec,ted to know 
the facts. But almost while Bracton was writing a statute29 extend-
ed the remedy beyond the third person from the disseisor to any 
. one who tame in after (post) the disseisin if under the disseisor's 
a Continued from the November issue . 
. '" The word "inclusive" means including the disseisor at one end and the heir's or 
grantee's heir or grantee at the other end. See 2 Pollock and Maitland 62, which is 
confusing in speaking of a fourth degree as to which there is no reason, and 3 Holds· 
worth's Hist. of Eng. Law, 8 is not very clear. The writs taken from the register arc 
printed in 3 Holdsworth, 497. 
'"Statute of Marlborough, cap. 29 (1267). 
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seism. And so the. writs were called in the Per, in the Per and Cui, 
and in the Post. 
Now it is apparent that these writs of entry could be converted 
into· a writ of right if the defendant could admit his entry under 
the circumstances stated in the writ and plea.d, by saying he had 
better right than the plaintiff. This would have ousted the wri.t of 
right and trial by grand assize and the Nonnan's claim of the battle. 
Naturally, therefore, the defendant was limited (1) to denying the 
right of entry assigned to him. He could not plead an inception of 
title older than that assigned. If he denied the entry assigned and 
the jury found his denial true., he won the case. But he could also 
( ~) admit the right of entry assigned to himself by plaintiff and 
plead matter subsequent in time to the inception of the entry as-
signed. In this way the writs of entry were kept possessory and did 
not oust the proprietary writ of right. 
The judges in inventing these writs and forms of .action, forced 
the plaintiff to· say in his pleading that he put himself, as to his cla.4n, 
upon the country, i.e., a jury. And the defendant, in order to plead 
in denial was foi:ced to say that he also put himself upon the coun-
try, or if he pleaded new matter in avoidance, the plaintiff in denying 
put himself on the country as to the new matter, and the defendant 
did likewise and so on. Thus early begq.n the conclusion of the 
common law declaration and the similiter and the rule that a plead-
ing alleging new matter concluded with a verification, but if it sim-
ply denied or traversed, it concluded .to the country. But the impo-
sition of the jury was enforced also in all other actions where it 
could be used, especially in the various actions of trespass and a 
little later in trespass on the case, as well as in debt and detinue. 
All this was judicial legislation of the most enlightened kind. But 
it was plain that as to the petty assizes, the twelve men were imposed 
by governmental authority; while as to the jury the ostensible rea-
son for their presence was an agreement of the parties. 
To apply this situation now to the attaint, we notice that the at-
taint was not given as to the jury verdicts but only as to those of 
the assizes. The difference in procedure was plain. The writ of 
assize defined the issue and called the defendant into court along 
with the twelve. While the other process required preliminary 
pleading, a defining of the is.sue and a venire facias for the jury 
after a definite ·issue was made. Bracton says that the attaint does 
not lie against a jury because both parties have agreed to submit the 
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controversy to the proof by the jury and no one should be heard to 
attack the twelve witnesses whom he has agreed to be bound by.80 
But this is IlO reason at all. The twelve in the assize and the •twelve 
on the venir~ were selected by the sheriff. The parties did no.t name 
them or any particular twelve witnesses. The fact was that the 
judges felt Uiat having forced the parties to jury witnesses, they 
could not stultify their own work by allowing an assault upon the. 
witness~. Probably back of it •all was the- feeling that an attaint 
prolonged the litigation. It is to ithe interest of the state that there 
be an _end to litigation, is a maxim of great power in English law. 
··. So despite the fa~ that there was just· as much necessity for an at-
taint in case of jury ~s in case of assize, the judges were not pre-
pared to extend the common law remedy for attaint to the new field. 
The same thought of not. prolonging litigation underlay the self-
eyident p~oposition, which seems strange to legal au1hors, that the 
writ of attaint was not issued of course (de curstt-) out of the chan-
cery, but by special indulg~nce. of the king. This does not mean 
that the king personally, as a matter of partiality, granted it when 
he pleased, but rather that the application was made in the chancery 
and the officers there, after a snowing and a eonsultation with the 
judges, issued the writ, or did not issue it as seemed best. It would 
have seemed as intolerable then as it would be today tha.t a litigant, 
as a matter of course, as soon as a verdict was returned against him, 
could allege a false oath and at once have a jury of twenty-four 
knights to pass anew on ithe issue. The verdict then and now was 
prima facie correct. The law could not in reason provide that the, 
incorrectness of the verdict should at once be assumed and writ of 
attaint at once issued. A showing was required, and very reasonably 
required before it would be issued. . 
·A statute was passed at once that made short work of Bracton's 
fanciful reason for discrimination. By Westminster !,31 which was 
one of Edward I's great reforming statutes, it was provided "that 
henceforth the king of his· office shall grant attaints upon inquests 
in plea· of land or of franchise or of thing touching the freehold 
when it shall seem to him that there is need." The same restraint 
upon the issuance of the writ is shown here. The writ does not go 
ao Bracton :zgob. The explanation in 2 Pollock and Maitland, 621, that the jurors 
were like the witnesses in wager of law, seems fancifuL Men as acute as the lawyers 
of that day knew the difference. Soon the judges were calling the witnesses in wager 
ot law a lot of rascals. 
11 Cap. 3S: Purvue est que de soresmes le Rei de son office dorra atentes sur les 
enquestcs en plai de tcrre ou de franchise ou de chose que touche fraunk tenement 
quant iL lui semblera quc besoigne seit. · 
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as a matter of course,82 but, to the king, i.e., to his judicial officers, 
it must be shown that there is need and the proof made must make 
a very strong showing of incorrectness in the verdict. In this .re-
spect the writ of attaint is exactly parallel to the present motion for 
a new trial. This statute was construed as e..'-.i:ending (as no doubt 
it was intended) the remedy of attaint to the verdicts of jurors. 
The popularity of the attaint is now manifest and in a few years the 
author of ·the Mirror88 will be clamoring to issue the writ of attaint 
out of the chancery without difficulty in order to attaint- all false 
jurors in all kinds of actions, personal, real or mixed. The tendency 
to assume that a remedy, which works well when carefully guarded 
and applied, will be good in· all cases when taken as a matter of 
course, is an incorrigible tendency of the human mind. · 
This statute does·not speak of damages given in attaint. It gives 
the writ as it had been used, and damages were a part of the rem-
edy by the common law, and both at the common law and under the 
statute of Westminster I, the damages of the plaintiff in the attaint 
were recoverable,3' and there never seems to have been any hesita-
tion in calling upon the jury of twenty-four to fix the damages of the 
plaintiff in the attaint when he prevailed. Likewise there never 
seems to have been any hesitation in giving the plaintiff in attaint 
full compensation for all that he had been compelled to pay by way 
of damages, amercement and costs by reason of the attainted ver-
dict and judgment. It is a common feature of the proceeding. 
But ·there is a question of damages midway between the reversal 
of the·judgment and its affirmance. It may be that a party desires 
to say that while he does not dispute the verdict against him in the 
principal matter of the verdict, he wishes to allege that the amount 
of damages given against him was too large. In our motion for new 
trial, this is the ground of excessive damages. In the mediaeval law 
such damages were called "outrageous." Orig"inally Bracton had 
stated that there could be no attaint in respect of the damages alone.8 " 
But in time the common law in its expansive powers made the prac-
tice of attaint meet this necessity, by giving the attaint for ~:>Ut· 
rageous damages. The first mention of this matter is a warning of 
82 Coke's contention that this statute made the writ " matter of course is wholly un-
tenable and it is strange that his extreme partisanship should not have seen the obvious 
objections to such a situation. 
n Mirror of Magistrates (Set. Soc.) 164 • 
.. The cases in Bracton's Note Book show that the party injured by the false ver· 
diet obtains the ·seisin he has lost and the damages that he has paid on the former 
verdict as well as his damages by being disseised under the false verdict. 
as Bracton 29ob. No attaint as to damages alone was evidently the practice as 
shown by Berwick's words below. 
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the judge to a jury in the year 1304 Berwick, Justice,88 tells the 
j~ry to find the damages of plaintiff, but warns them to be careful, 
for the attaint "nowadays" lies upon the damages. The practice 
w.as then evidently well settled; how long -it had been in operation 
cannot be said. 
But:the·fu.w in its method was as practical as it is today. If the 
plaintiff, paving recovered excessive ·damages, released all above 
a certain sum, a false oath could not be assigned on the damages 
. released,81 although by the confession of the party and by his re-
.. lease, rthe falseness of the verdict as to'the damages was admitted. 
· But the lawyers did ~ot readily give up their attempt to hold the 
jury responsible for excessive damages, and as late as the reign of 
Henry VI.I ( 1499) the aggrieved party was attempting to prevent 
the jury from obtaining the defence of a plaintiff's release,38 iust as 
at the present time excessive damages are urged to show that the 
jury has been influenced by passion' or prejudice in passing on the 
issues. · · 
Difficulties in pleading the false verdict as to the excessive dam-
ages were bound to arise~ and i~· one .of the Year Books39 a iustice 
sugge~ts a method of assigning the false verdict in trespass to goods, 
by saying that the party could allege .that the goods were of a cer-. 
tain V<!-lue and no more and in all the damages iiven above that value 
there was a 'false oatlt.. The court in the early period .could either 
reduce or increase the damages, a power ~nder the common law 
which cour:ts have lost, but no false 9ath could be assigned either 
· regarding the damages as increased or the damages as ·reduced by 
• Y. B. 30·31, Edward I (Rolls Ser.) u4. Thayer (Treat. Evid. 147>' understands 
this pr~ceeding aga~st exce5sive damages to rest on the statute of W~tininster I of.' 
1275. But this cannot be true. The authority is the other way. Y. B. Pasch, 3 Henry ' 
IV; pt 3-, Cpke 2 In~t. J30, Brooke Abridg., Attaint, .µ. 
ary. B. 12 Edward IV, 56; Y. B. 14 Henry VII, 5. 
as Y. B. 14 Henry VII, i. 5, II on a writ of attaint Sergeant Yaxley assigned the 
false oath in this, that the jury had assessed the damages in an action of trespass to 
the person (trans de battery) excessively (trope outrageousment). Yaxley argued, in 
answer to Keble's statement that the plaintiff had released six pounds of the ten pounds 
damages, that it was iiot reasonable that the act of the plaintiff should C.'CCUse the jury's 
false oath. But Fineu...., C. J., held that loss was the basis of attaint. 
• Y. B. 12 Edw. IV, 56; F,itzh. Att. u. If a man recover excessive (outrageous) 
damages in trespass and the plaintiff releases parcel of the damages, the false oath can· 
not be assigned by the defendant if he brings attaint as to those damages released, for 
as to them he is not aggrieved, and one of the justices said that he could assign a 
false oath in this form, to·wit: that the goods were worth forty shillings or other sum 
which would be the true value in fact and if the damages assessed (taxes) were beyond 
that sum, he could' assign the false oath in the excess and it was clearly agreed that, 
as to costs, no attaint lies. This statement as to costs must be understood as meaning 
the amount of costs, since they were fixed by the clerks. 
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the court!0 .This last case seems to suggest that in attaint a party 
prevailing could assign, as a false oath, that the damages were too 
small. Theoretically and practically there would be no difficulty. in 
this proceeding and probably such cases existed but I have found 
none. Under our new trial practice, the only way in which a court 
can rectify insufficient damages, is by granting a new tFial with a 
venire de novo, but the attaint met no such difficulty. 
The inhibition against assigning an attaint upon the action of the 
judge during the trial in regard to damages, directs attention '1:o an-
other matter. We have noticed the case in Bracton's Note Book 
where a jury was attainted although forced to a certain verdict by 
the erroneous action of the justices. But it was soon settled that the 
jury could not be made responsible for the act of the judge unless 
they had rendered a general verdict on the whole issue by incorpor-
ating the judge's bad law into their verdict. 'l'hus it was'very early 
held that if the jury find a special verdict and ref er the matter of 
law, as rto whether there was a disseisin to the court and the matter 
of law be incorrectly decided by the court, no attaint lies against 
the jury for this is not their default but that of the court, yet if in 
~he special verdict a matter be found falsely, attaint lies upon that 
matter.41 Thus early the distinction between judicial error and ·a 
false verdict emphasized the :witnessing and ignored the judicial 
function of the jury. 
After the passage of the statute of \Vestminster I in r275 it seems 
to have been held that the attaint was applied to the verdicts of 
juries ·involving the freehold, although as to this there has been 
doubt expressed.42 It may be that a natural disinclination of the 
judges to extend the attaint led to a narrow construction of the stat-
u,te. Perhaps they held that the word "inquests" did not include 
juries. The Mirror seems to say that attaints lay only as to assizes, 
but the available evidence is the other way.· About this time and 
before the passage of any other statute, it is found that the chief 
justice in an eyre can grant writs of attaint as to verdicts of assizes 
or juries given in that eyre without any recourse being had to the 
40 Y. B. 9 Henry VI, 2b. Today a court cnn force a reduction of damages by the 
new trial. But the remittitur is the party's act in theory. Thus we see the "good old 
fiction" still in active operation. But the court should have the correlative power to 
increase the damages. Generally speaking, the only help for a party who claims dam· 
ages given to be inadequate, is to submit to a new trial. 
41 43 Ass. 41, Rolle Abridg: Att. (K) 2. This situation must have led to special 
verdicts. 3 Reeves, Hist. of Eng. I.aw (Finlason ed) 304, note (a) is incorrect in say-
ing that no attaint lay on a special verdict. The case of Scoland v. Grandison, I Y. B. 
Eyre of Kent, infra, is a case of special verdict where the attaint was allowed. 
"Y. B. 3 Eyre of Kent (Se!. Soc.) Introd. p. xi, viL 
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chancery. ·The chief justice in eyre could act only through his power 
delegated by the king in the articles of eyre and hence it must have 
been true that the king out of the chancery could grant writs of at-
taint upon verdicts of juries/3 if the judges could do so. 
In the· Year Book of the Eyre of Kent is found a picture of an 
actual trial as it took place, for ~ ~e seems to be accurately re-, 
potted. In explanation of the W<?rd eyre, which is the Latin iter, 
it may lie said that once in so many years the king's justices, under 
articles of •eyre, were ins.tructed to visit a. certain county and try all 
the cases there, both civil and criminal and make investigation into 
all 9erelictions by .individuals or public bodies. The visitation was 
considered ~ oppressive thing and at one time was limited to take 
place not more than once in seven years. In the year 1312 and 1313 
the king's justices were holding such an eyre in the county of Kent. 
Sometime before the. eyre William de Grandison had brought a 
novel disseisin against Frcmk de Scoland, complaining that Frank 
had unjustly and without judgment disseised him. The trial turned 
upon an estate tail. These estates in tail had been created by the 
statq.te D_e Donis." The statute probably adopted an older writ for 
a remedy and the judges devised three actions called fom1edon. 
' (forme done or forma doni) to enforce the statute. If the heir in 
~il s~ed he used the formedon in the descender, the remainderman 
brought formedon in the remainder. and-the reversioner would bring 
a formedon in the reverter. All these writs were necessarily based 
upon a deed which had created a fee tail and w~re on the title. 
The facts as developed w~re .that Frank de Scoland was the heir 
of .Geoffrey ·de Scoland, an· U:ncle. The uncle Geoffrey had an .me-
gitima~e son Richard, and the father gave to this son an estate tail 
in certain land. It was useless, of course, to grant him more, as a 
l>astard could have only heirs of the bOdy. 'l'his gift left Geoffrey 
owner of the reversion in fee. which would descend to Frank, his law-
ful heir. Richard died with~ut heirs of the body after Geoffrey, the 
•There is an assertion of ~ a power by Berwick, Justice, in Y. B. 30·31 Ed· 
ward I, 124, who says, "There may be an attaint 011 the damages out of this court 
without the ,need of seeking it in the chancery." The note in the Eyre Year Boole is 
carelessly made. On page 138 of Y. B., 3 Eyie of Kent (Set. Soc.) it is said that upon 
all disseisins (verdicts or assizes?) the attaint may be had without a writ from the 
chancery. On· page 205, Id. the note is that the chief justice can grant by his own 
writ an attaiut upon any assize taken in the eyre. But the Y. B. 20·21 Edward I, 
some years before the Eyre of Kent Year Book, lays it down without qualification, that 
the juetices in eyie can grant an attaint without a writ from the chancery. Y. B. 20-21 
Edward I (Rolls Ser.) 108. The matter is of little importance on acconnt of the 
statute of 13a6 which was soon to be passed, but the con~lusion that attaiuts upon ver-
dicts of juries were covered by the statute seems to be warranted. 
"State of Westminster II, cap. 1 (1285). 
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father, had died, and Frank, as the heir of Geoffrey, owner of the 
reversion, entered. But the lord of the fee was William de Grandi-
son of whom Geoffrey held the land and he also had entered, claim-
ing an escheat in this way: he said that Geoffrey, the father, after 
he had granted the fee tail to his bastard son Richard, had released 
the reversion in fee also to Richard, so that Richard, by merger of 
the fee tail in the reversion, had become the owner in fee of the land 
and he, being incapable of having general heirs and leaving no heirs 
of the body had left the estate without any one to inherit and hence 
it would escheat to .the one of whom it was held, namely, William 
de Grandison, the lord of the fee. The assize found in favor of the 
release by a special verdict reciting the deed and the release and the 
facts. 
Frank de Scoland now relying upon advice that formedon was a 
higher action than a novel disseisin, whicp. tried the possession, and 
believing a jury would find no release, brought before this eyre a 
formedon in the reverler.4s The defendant Grandison now orally 
pleaded in bar ithe judgment in novel disseisin as res judicata. Gil-
bert de Touthby, a celebrated serjeant, replying, said: "This forme-
don is a higher action on the title and is not upon the possession." 
As a matter of fact, however, the jury in the novel disseisin had 
found the deed and release· specially and this issue was on the title 
and the issue on the £orinedon would be precisely the same as de-
fined in the special verdict, namely, was there a release in fee by 
Geoffrey t~ the dead Richard. So Grandison's counsel said that 
Frank!s remedy was by attaint, for as long as that judgment stood 
it was a bar.46 Spigurnel, Justice, answered Touthby: "What you 
say, Gilbert, would be well enough if the assize had simply found a 
verdict of seised and disseised but they have by special verdict found 
all the facts as to title and upon them the justices hav~ awarded the 
disseisin. Wherefore, if the attaint jury says that they had made a 
false oath concerning the release, the verdict of the assize would be 
sufficiently attainted by it appearing that "'William was not disseised." 
It begins to be apparent that i~ the issue in the possessory action is 
on the title, the court will consider the issue as what was actually 
passed upon. Here it is plain that the issue tried by the possessory 
assize was not possession but property. The possessory action of 
.. Y. B. 2 Eyre of Kent (Sel. Soc.) 189, 193, 197· 
.. In Y. B. 21-22 Edward I (Rolls Ser.) 428, a woman brought a writ of right and 
it was pleaded against her that she had brought a novel desseisin and the verdict and 
judgment were .against her, therefore attaint WM her remedy. But the defendant after 
making the objection pleaded over for the pleasure of the justices (pour le pleer des 
justices). 
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as.s!z.e had been in effect as much proprietary as the writ of right or 
the fonnedon on the deed. Thus Frank was non-suited. 
He now proceeded to London and must have shown the officials 
in the chancery that the release was a fraud, for he returned with a 
writ of attaint.'7 The sh~riff summoned Grandison, the defendant 
in attaint, also the jury in the assize and the twenty-four law worthy 
.(legales) knights. The writ assigned, generally, a false oath made 
by the twelve of the assize. Grandison and seven of the jury appear-
ed, two of the jury were distrained and three were dead. Frank de 
Scoland's serjeant first stated the particulars wherein the oath was 
false (I) in finding the release, ( 2) in finding that Richard held of 
Grandison and did .homage to Grandison and (3) in the matter of 
damages. The defendant Grandison ·was now ordered to state any 
reason why the attaint should not be taken. 
The oral pleas for Grandison began. First the objection was made 
that all the twelve were not present. This was,overruled as a mat-
ter of course, the law being that de~th of jurors did not destroy the 
remedy. The proposition that it did is as astonishing as would be 
a plea in bar by one burglar ithat his partner in crime was dead. 
Next it was objected that the judgment in the novel disseisin had 
never. been executed by the payment of the damages and costs. This 
plea, was disproven by inspection of the record. The next objection 
was tliat ·the writ of attaint was not presented at the opening of the 
eyre as required by the articles of the eyre. This was ·overruled, 
because the justices in the eyre could grant attaints themselves. Here 
one of the counsel for Grandison asked for a· bill of exception on 
this plea,'8 but one of the justices replied: "We will make no -bill, 
but you have the testimony of the whole court, so lodge your excep-
tion." Finally it was objected that the tenant of.the land, the grantee 
Df Grandison s~nce the verdict in the assize, was made a party to the 
attaint, but had not been a party to the assize, and he was therefore 
not a proper party. This objection was overruled for the tenant was 
liable for the damages accruing since the assize. 
_Thereupon Hartlepool for Grandison said to the court: "By your 
leave we will impart (consult) with the twelve of the first disseisin," 
"Y. B. I E;yre of Kent (SeL Soc.) 158, 160. 
"This proves that the Statute of Westminster II, cap. 31, which gives a bill of 
exceptions, was applicable originally to pleas offered in oral pleading and refused by 
the cotirt. It had nothing to do with exceptions as we have them, for an exception 
then was a· plea. See 13 Michigan Law Rev. 457 for an e."<planation of the whole mat-
ter of the early meaning of a bill of e..'tceptions. The word exception in the statute and 
above means the pleadi.ng offered, not an objection reserved upon it. The translator has 
wholly mistaken the point by using objection for exception. He was to lodge his ex-
ception or plea written out. 
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i.e., the accused assize. Staunton, Justice, replied: "Pray do so." 
The defendants withdraw and return and ·now a new objection is 
made, that the false oath was assigned as to the release, tenqre, 
homage and damages, but not to the whole issue of seisin and dis-
seisin. Spigurnel-ruled shortly: "All findings of fact are open to 
be attainted." And the defendant having exhausted his objections, 
the oath was administered to one of the twelve and to the others, one 
by one in succession. An oath was too solemn a ceremony to be 
administered in our method, to the whole jury toge~er. Each jury-
man said: "Hear, ye Justices, I will speak the truth of this assize 
and of the freehold of which I have had the view by command of 
the king, and of the oath of the twelve and in naught will I fail." 
Thereupon Spigurnel, the chief justice Qf the eyre, ·recited to the 
attaint jury the pleadings at the assize and the verdict of the twelve, 
and charged the twenty-four knights to say whether the twelve had 
made a false oath or not, in so far as they said· that Geoffrey re-
leased to Richard all his right and that Richard held of Grandi:;on 
and did homage to Grandison and in the matter of damages. . The 
twenty-four said that the twelve made a false oath, (I) as to the 
release, (2) as to the damages and (3) as to Richard holding of 
Grandison but not as to the homage. The judges at once ruled that 
the homage was immaterial because not owed. Then Spigurnel said: 
"Gentlemen, (bons gents),49 tell us Frank's damages since the as-
size." The jury answered, "Seven score marks." Thereupon Frank 
was given his seisin, his damages of fifteen marks paid at the first 
assize,. with his amercement and costs and one hundred and forty 
marks further damages. The n.ine jurors were ordered to prison, 
but they paid fines of from one to forty pounds. · 
This actual picture of an attaint trial shows a remarkably bus-
iness-like way of holding court and differs from a trial today only 
in ·two particulars: first, ·the pleadings are oral, stated to the court 
and if disallowed are not a part of the record; and second, no evi-
dence whatever is offered but the jury answer as witnesses out of 
their own knowledge. \Ve see none of the interminable objections 
to evidence, nor do the serjeants·for the respective parties make any 
statements to the jury. · 
Attaint was now a remedy g1:"Clwing in popularity. Wisely guard-
ed, it was a desirable method of reversing an injustice. Bu.t soon 
one safeguard was removed by tlie statute of I326. r.o ·False verdicts 
••The transiator of the Year Books translates "Bons gents" "good people." It is 
needless to say that twenty-four knights would not be addressed as if they were ordinary 
jurymen. 
.. Stat. x Edward III, cap. 6. 
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were probably nt.imerous. Ignorance, prejudice or improper influ-
ence then, as now, would be certain to influence or to be used with 
a jury, and litigants naturally claimed that they were entitled to the 
attaint as a matter of right without making any preliminary show-
ing in the chancery. Official discretion then as now was supposed 
to cover, and then as now did cover, much partiality and unfairness. 
The statute recites "greaJI: mischiefs, damages, and destruction of 
divers persons, as well as of the men of holy church by the false 
oa~h of 'jurors in writs of trespass!; and then it is enacted that the 
writ of attaint be allowed for the principal matter and also for dam-
ages in trespass, and the chancellor is to grant such wri.ts without 
speaking to the.king: Behind this statute we can see the great ec-
clesiastical land-owners distraining upon their tenants and being 
su~d in trespass for damages, and then appearing in cour:t to face a 
hostile jury. The action of trespass has now entered upon its vic-
torious career as trespass on the case, trespass on the case on prom-
ises (assumpsit), trover and conversion and trespass in ejectment 
whereby i!f: was to cover almost the whole field of legal remedy. The 
.statute did nothing new in giving the remedy as to the principal 
issue as w.ell as to the damages, but it was new in the two respects 
of gi~ng the remedy in a'n actions of trespass and of providing for 
the writ as a matter of course out of the chancery. Henceforth any 
one dissatisfied with a verdict could appeal to the attaint without 
making any preliminary showing as to the probable falseness of a 
verdict. It was still plain to the legislaiture an~ the courts that the 
jur.y were only witnesses to, not judges of, the fact. 
The remedy continued to grow in popularity. But the theory was 
to give it only in cases where the damages exceeded forty shillings 
both on 'bills and writs· of trespass.c1 This was a temporary expedi-
ent for in 1354 the limit was reinoved.112 In the meantime the 
clamor continued for the attaint in all cases113 until at last the author 
of the Mirror's wish came true, and in 13t5o the remedy of attaint 
was granted as a matter of course in all pleas, real and personal.H 
If Andrew Horn wrote the Mirror, he was a reformer before hi~ 
time, but like most reformers he had taken a thing good under cer-
tain circu'mstances and by removing restraints upon its use had put 
it in the way of destruction. The opposite side of the picture was 
pres~nt to the judges. Verdicts assaulted as a matter of course, 
finality of decisio~s disturbed by any dissatisfied litigant led to the 
11 Stat. s Edward III, cap. 7 • 
. a Stat. 28 Edward III, c:ap. 8. 
a Thayer, Treat. :i;:vid., 14& 
, 
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allowance of dilatory proceedings against the writ. Where there 
were so many defendants, there was no limit to the delay. 
The legislature tried to remedy the defect. The finding on a plea 
of one defendant was made to apply to all. But still "great, fearless 
and shameless perjury horribly continues and increases daily among 
common jurors of the realm," and the legislature turned to the e..'C- · 
pedient of increasing the qualifications of_ the attaint jurors.55 This 
seems to be a strange expedient: ·There would have been some rel-
evancy in increasing the qualifications of petty jurors, but the qual-
ifications of attaint jurors were already high. The word knights 
was not a mere name. It called for a particular class of the gentryA 
But it was the old difficulty of attempting to make people honest by 
legislation. No safeguards were provided for the deliberations of 
the twelve jur0rs. They made up the verdict as they pleased. There 
were no means of correcting their findings by the court. The jury 
were, in theory, still witnesses and the only witnesses, and their 
verdict was a finality to the court. Bribery was, no doubt, a common 
incident. Govemmen,t was growing weaker under Henry VI and 
this was the situation when the Wars of the Roses began in 146o, 
with the consequent unsettling of the ordinary affairs of life. 
The courts, in the meantime, had been working with the proceed-
ing by attaint. They found no difficulty in moulding the judgment 
so as to apportion the damag-es among the defendants.56 Their atti-
tude is reflected in the ruling that if a deed was set up and the 
witnesses to the deed were .added to the jury,· a proceeding that was 
the corollary of the jury of twelve witnesses and 1:he result of the 
parties putting themselves upon the witnesses to the deed, there 
could be no attaint, because the witnesses to the deed upon whose 
information it was assumed the ·jury acted, could not be attainted.157 
This points dearly to the time when witnesses do not testify to the 
jury.but must be added to the jury. But the jury might find against 
the deed and in that case it was held that the jury could be attaint-
"' Stat. 34 Edward Ill, cap. 7. 
11 Thayer, Treat. Evid. 149. 
"' Y. B. Mich. 46 Edward III, pl. 5. 
"'Y. B. 20·21 Edward I (Rolls Ser.) 108; Y. B. n-1~ Edward III (Rolls Ser.) 338. 
Fitzh. Att. 26. At the Michaelmas term, II Ed. III, Sharshulle, Justice, said openly, 
that in case the witnesses to a deed are joined to the twelve, one shall never have 
attaint because the twelve cannot be attainted if the witnesses are not attainted and 
they shall not be because they are sworn to speak to their knowledge, while the jury 
are to speak the truth outright (a tout atrench). Fitzh. Att. 6 refers to a case in 6 
Henry VI where the witnesses were dead. Coke, 2 Inst. 662 says that attaint lies if 
found no deed, but not where found a deed if the witnesses are joined to the jury. 
Rolle Abridg. Attaint (A) 14 to the same effect.. 
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ed.58 Then it was held that if a party had any other remedy than the 
attaint, if he could make the question he desired to be settled the 
basis of a cause of action, he could not have attaint.69 So if in the 
litigation a fact was admitted to be true, no attaint lay upon the 
verdict as to that fact. 00 So it was held as to an immaterial fact 
or in regard to surplusage ;61 but if issue was joined as to a fact and 
the fact was found, whether it was immaterial or not, a,ttaint lay 
upon the verdict. 62 
Of the attempt that was made to claim an attaint pending as a 
.supe1·sedeas the cour,t made short work. The argument was, no 
doubt, that it would be unconscionable to enforce the judgment 
when it. was alleged that the verdict was false, but the courts held 
to the proposition that the judgment was good until it was reversed 
by attaint.63 The law was strict in holding that no one not a party 
to the verdict sought to be attainted, unless he be the heir or execu-
tor, could bring the attaint. The idea has profoundly affected the doc-
trine of res jiedicata. Passeley, whom the court in a Year Book ad-
dresses as a ·"le gist," ( i. c., one acquainted with the R9man Law) 
.says that the reason why one not a party to a judgment may by 
.averment, i.e., by parol, adduce matter contrary to the fact estab-
lished by the judgm~t, is ~hat no one not a party to a verdict can 
bring attaint up.on it.04 Thus we have the. original of the rule that 
judgments not in rem conclude parties and privies but not strangers. 
Likewise it was said in a Year Book that no attaint lies upon wager 
• See preceding note. What was done when the witnesses testified against the deed 
.and the jury believed them? 
.. Fitzh. Att. 4- At the Trinity Term 6 Henry VI where false oath was assigned 
in two things and it appeared that the party had a cause of action for them, by advice 
-of all of the judges, he was denied attaint. 
"Y. B. 11 Henry IV, 27. Rolle Abridg. Att. (I) 5. In trespass the defendant 
pleaded in abatement the misnomer of the viii in which the venue was laid. the old 
rule was that if a man pleaded in abatement and he lost the judgment was quod recu· 
peret. This was the law in Illinois until recently. The issue on the venue was found 
against the party, but the jury also found the defendant guilty of trespass and it was 
held that attaint did not lie upon the finding of guilty of trespas~, since that was ad· 
mitted by the plea in abatement and could not have been in issue. · 
11 Y. B. 14 Edward III (Rolls Ser.), 28; Rolle Abridg. Attaint (D) 1, 2. 
"'Y. ll. ·12 Henry VI, 6b. 
a Y. B. 2 Henry IV, 18; Y. B. 2·3 Edward II (Se!. Soc.), 157· In a quare impedit 
·against an abbot wherefore he impeded Bigot in his presentation, a judgment was given 
for Bigot. Then the abbot brought an attaint but Bigot died before the attaint was 
taken. Then a vacancy occurred in the benefice and the abbot again imped~d, but the 
executors of Bigot brought a dariein presentment and the abbot pleaded an attaint pend· 
ing, but it was held that this attaint did not affect the conclusiveness of the judgment 
until it was actually reversed, and the presentation was awarded to the executors with· 
.out taking an assize . 
.. Y. B. l·:> Edward II (Sel. Soc.) u3. 
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of law even alleging its falsity, and therefore where wager of 
law had been allowed as a defense but not waged and thereupon 
in the same case the parties joined issue and went to the country and 
then •the wager of law was made and judgment had, no trial could 
take p1ace by a jury upon the issue joined, because the one judg-
·ment might contradict the other.65 There never was any question 
but that the heir of the party affected could bring attaint, and by 
statute the rule was e"'-i:ended so as to enable the reversioner to 
bring attaint upon a verdict against the life tenant.66 
Under the Yorkist kings (r46o-1485) more .liberality was shown 
toward the attaint and a greater harshness toward trial juries, and 
this is noticeable in the strictness with which the verdicts were con-
strued with reference to the pleadings. Thus the faw was that if one 
pleads a right of common as appendant to land and this is tra-
versed and put in issue and upon the trial he makes proof of a right 
of. common time out of mind, saying nothing as to land, he has 
proven a right of common in gross and the defendant shall have 
attaint. Similarly, says the Justice, "if I and my ancestors have en-
. joyed a rent time out of mind as foresters of such and such a forest 
and I bring an assize for the rent, alleging seisin of such a rent,' and 
the seisin as alleged is traversed or denied and I make title that I 
-and my ancestors have h·ad the rent time out of mind, without show-
ing that we had it as foresters, and it be found against the defend-
ant, lie shall maintain the attaint ;" and the same law is applied to a 
rent service alleged to be out of land and proof of a rent by pre-
scription without showing that the land is,held by it.67 Here we 
note the good old rule now applied in indictments, that the allegation 
must be proven as laid; and if a thing be described with particularity, 
it must be proven in all tha,t particularity. It is apparent that if a 
jury is to apply this rule on penalty of being held criminals if they 
violate it, the strictness of law has become rigorous injustice. But 
these cases are important to show that now proof of title is being 
made in court by evidence to the jury and the evidence given to the 
trial jury is being proven before the attainting jury to show that the 
trial jury made a false oath. 
· . At this time, too, it was decided that the right to an attaint as to a 
verdict concerning land claimed by a fee tail, descended with the 
land. The release of the person prejudiced by the attaint could not 
ea Y. B. 2-3 Edward II (Set. Soc.) 138. This assumes that no attaint could be 
brought against the witnesses in wager of law. 
eo Thayer, Treat. Evid. 148. 
81 Y. B. 10 Edward IV, 17. 
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affect the heir's right to bring it,08 since the tenant in tail could not 
alienate the land to the prejudice of the heir in. tail. The right to 
pursue the remedy survived to any surviving plaintiff in attaint. 
Even in the case of husband and wife, the right survived to the wife 
and did not pass to the husband's executors.60 The old rule of as-
signing the false oath on the whole verdict without particulars, was 
steadily upheld. It was sufficient to say that the jury made a false. 
oath in everything which they said against the person alleging the 
false oath,70 and the court carefully discriminatesi between attaint 
and writ of error, for it is not sufficient in error to assign in omnibus 
erratum est, but some certain matter should be assigned. Our law 
as -to specifications of error has a long and illustrious descent. 
To the proposition now urged upon the Yorkist judges, that the 
effect of the attamt ought not to go further than necessary and ·ought 
simply ·to reverse a judgment founded upon a verdict which has not 
changed the possession, a majority of the Common Bench, among 
whom was Littleton, the author of the Tenures, held that the ver-
di~t of the twenty-four attainting the former verdict required the 
judgment to be entered that would hav~ been first entered if the 
jury had found:truly.71 
It was about this time (I470) that Chief Justice Fortescue was 
writing his book De Laudibu-.s Legum Angliae. It may be called the 
swan song of the old trial by.the jury as witnesses. Already, as we 
have seen by the cases as to correspondence of allegation and proof, 
evidence is being offered before the jury. But this change had come 
imperceptibly and men then, just as now, failed to see the inevitable· 
results of a great change. Fortescue has left us a very noble and elo-
quent plea for the old system. He points out as one of the advan-
• Y.' B. 14 E;dward III, 41. Technically, this judgment is correct, for a tenant in 
tail by collusion could let the verdict go against him and then release bis right to bring 
attaint and absolutely bar the heir in tail as to the land. 
• Y. B. Mich. 46 E;dward III, D. 5. 'l'bis case is noted in Statham's Abridgement. 
And here let me dra\v attention to the translation of Statham by Margaret Center 
Klingelsmitb. The edition is a marvel of industry and scholarly devotion, even if one 
cannot always agree with the translation ·or the notes. 
11 Y. B. 6 E;dward IV, 5, Fitzh. Attaint. 'l· 
n Y. B. 8 E;dward IV, 8, Fitzh. Attaint, 8. Littleton, Needham and another justice 
held where a man brought a formedon and the tenant pleaded a release and the jury 
found for the release, that although the verdict did not change the possession, yet upon 
a verdict in attaint as to the release that the jury made a false oath, the demandant 
shall recover the land; and so in debt, if a man is barred of his debt alleged and he 
assigns a false oath on the verdict and the attaint. finds with him, he shall recover his 
debt. But Danby, a great name in English law, and another judge said that the judg-
ment on the first action was that the demandant take nothing wherefore he shall be 
restored to his cause of action but -not to the land for he has not lost it. But the 
others said as before. 
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tages o'f jury trial in determining questions of fact over the method. 
of the civil law, where the tribunal hears witnesses and where two 
witnesses to a fact are sufficient, that any litigant can find ·two men 
who are ready, for fear or favor, to go counter to the truth in any-
thing. He scouts the idea: that oral testimony can be relied upon, 
as compared with the English jury of witnesses, twelve in number, 
choseri by ~ public official from among men of property of the vicin-
age, who are subject to challenge and ac.t under the sanction of an 
oath, whose verdict may be attainted if untrue by the verdict of 
twenty-four of the leading men in the vicinity. He says that on a 
trial witnesses may be heard, but the jury know all that the wit-
nesses can tell •them, and he does not add what he no doubt knew, 
that the English law discouraged the production of witnesses.72 
The early history of the jury system affords a study of the in-
evitable tendency to overload an efficient remedy. · 'Vhen the assize 
was invented every thinking person was disgusted with trial by wit-
nesses produced by the party. As a judge in an early Year Book 
says the compurgating witnesses were rascals. The contempt for 
witness testimony long endured in English law and is nowhere 
shown more strongly than in Fortescue's De Lazedibus. The assize 
substitilted twelve sworn and -indifferent witnesses who knew the 
facts. The remedy was. theoretically confined to proof of events 
supposed to be within the knowledge of the twelve men summoned. 
The ~ensions to other remedies . .were at first confined to proof of 
such events. Bracton shows that the reason for the degrees in dis-' 
seisin was that the jury would not know facts so remote as those 
beyond the degrees. But the legislature paid no attention to ·this 
obvious consideration and extended the twelve witnesses to the most 
remote happenings. The functions of the jury became so overloaded 
that it could no longer respond as witnesses but must make inquiries 
of other witnesses. The transformation was assisted by the growing 
complexity of human· life and intercourse and growing trade and 
commerce. The results were (I) all sorts of wrong influences ex-
erted upon the jury, and, (2) the production of witnesses in co11rt. 
These results were actually the creation of a wholly anomalous and 
irresponsible body which was not bound by the testimony although 
it received testimony. The attaint was also overloaded and beca~e 
unworkable. The trouble with the jury system for over two hun-
dred years was not that people were necessarily less honest than 
they are today, but that the jury of tw~lve witnesses was called upon 
to perform a task wholly unsuited to its method of selection and de-
'12 See 10 Ill~ois Law Rev. 549, 550. 
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liberation. We can plainly see today that as soon as the jury began 
to hear evidence as a judicial body, its function as a witnessing body, 
pure and simple, through the knowledge of its members was .no 
longer being performed. As a judicial body its deliberations re-
quired stric.t control by the court, not by another jury of twenty-
four. Still the law continued to regard the jury in two wholly ir-
reconcilable ways and it was asked to perform a task for which it 
was never designed. This was the actual situation when Chief Jus-
tice Fortescue was sounding the praises of the old jury of witnesses. 
The doom of the practice of attaint is evident, though it took 
many years to find it out. The production of evidence to a jury had 
begun with written evidence. The entering wedge was shown by 
the ruling that the jurors could not be attainted for relying upon 
the witnesses to a deed. Now came a ruling that in attaint where a 
party gives in evidence a record which was not shown to the petty 
jury, it will be a good plea for the petty jury on trial for a false 
oath to say that this record was not shown to them, for they will not 
be driven to take notice of something not shown to them.73 This is 
the end of the attaint. No longer did the twenty-four come to say 
what was the fact and to pass upon the first jury's verdict only inci-
dentally. Now they are trying the jury as a judicial body which 
hears and passes upon evidence. The staple of litigation has changed 
to the 'minds of men. Life is no longer so simple as before. Com-
merce and trade, the growing wealth of the community, the aboli-
tion of villenage, the growth of towns and cities, have made life 
complicated. No longer is litigation concerned with matters that all 
the neighbors know and of which the jury must speak truly at their 
peril. Now the neighbors have become a body who hear evidence 
and decide from the evidence. The attaint jury was now itself 
hearing evidence and from that evidence trying the mental processes 
of the petty jury and deciding whether they acted reasonably on the 
evidence which they had. 
The law, which is always more reasonable than it seems, recog-
nized the obvious change to a certain extent. The judges could not 
shut their eyes to what was happening in court before them. They 
could not hold a jury guilty of perjury when they had seen that jury 
listening to conflicting evidence and trying to ascertain the truth. 
The courts soon were holding that the plaintiff in attaint cannot give 
more in evidence to the attainting jury than he presented to the first 
jury. He cannot bring fonvard additional witnesses. Yet, on the 
other hand, the issue being yet clouded with the idea that the at-
11 Fitzh. Attaint 9; Y. B. Hi!. 7 Edward IV, 29. 
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tainting jury are passing upon the actual fact, the defendant in at-
taint may offer more evidence than was given to the first jury in 
order to show that the first verdict was correct. The law is always 
more practical than logical and ~as driven to a wholly illogical com-
promise. It allowed the parties to try the truth of the first verdict, 
but tied the hands of one of the parties; this it did in deference to 
its other and wholly contradictory theory, that it was trying the fair-
ness of the first jury's'mental processes. Judges were now telling 
the twenty-four gentlemen on the attainting jury that they must look 
to the eVidence given to the first jury, and if that was sufficient to 
justify their verdict, it was immaterial what the truth was. This 
was no doubt the law; but it is a curious thing to say to a jury which 
was asked by the writ and sworn by their oath, to find the truth as 
to the actual fact. u The court in effect charged that the oath was 
immaterial. In order that the law be co~sistent, the attainting jury 
should have been asked to say, first, was the verdict true and, sec-
ond, was it arrived at reasonably. If not true but arrived at reason-
ably, the judgment should have been reversed but the jury acquitted. 
This obvious solution did not occur to the judges of that age, for 
. the reason that they talked only in tennsof precedent and they could 
not understand the changes that had come over the jury trial. It 
may be that the liberal minded lawyers of the Renaissance would 
have· remedied the matter, but with the advent of the Stuart Kings, 
the sanctity of the jury became a political issue and it triumphed with 
the downfall of the· Stuarts. 
As soon as the- jury trial changed its character, there was appar-
ent a practical difficulty in the administration of the law. The at-
tainting juries would not convict the petty juries. "The gentlemen," 
says Sir Thomas Smith, "will not meet to slander and deface the 
honest yeomen, their neighbors, * * * and if (they) do appear, 
gladlier will they confirm the first sentence. "111 This was bound to be 
so, but all the time the clamor went up to parliament against the 
gross and horrible perjuries of the petty jurors, from men who were 
losing cases. .The courts gave a remedy for setting aside a verdict 
for misconduct of the jury after they had assembled in court. 76 but 
the only :r.emedy for other misconduct was the attaint. At last the 
wise men in parliament reached the conclusion that the severity of 
the punishment was deterring attainting juries from finding the 
n Ro1£e v. Hampden, I Dyer 53b. The Justice Shelley in this case was an ancestor 
of the poet Shelley and seems to have had some of his curious contradictions in reason· 
ing • 
.,. Quoted Thayer, Treat. ~id. 153. 
" See 10 Illinois I.aw Rev. 553, note :z5. 
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petty juries guilty of a false oath, and a law was passed as a tem-
porary expedient, continued by later acts, revived under Henry VIII 
and made permanent under Elizabeth, for lightening the punishment 
to a fine. 77 , 
But the fault was not in the punishment, for the attaint became 
less and less workable. The fact was that the tribunal of twenty-
four, when it came to a question of hearing evidence and passing 
upoµ the reasonableness of the petty jury's conduct, was not a proper 
1:ribunal. They would naturally assume that the petty jury acted 
fairly, to the best of its knowledge and mental capacity and since 
they could not find the issue differently, .without convicting the petty 
jurors of a crime, they allowed the one issue to outweigh the other. 
Only in cases of manifest corruption would there. be a chance for a 
verdict for the plaintiff in attaint. Yet the technical rules were made 
all the more stringent, so that the greatest lawyer of Eliza-
beth's reign goes so far in his reports as to say that ·the attaiµt was 
such that a jury could be convicted though every word in their ver-
dict was true.78 The courts extended the remedy as far as they 
could by holding cases within the equity of the statute, giving .the 
attaint against the heir and against the executors of the tenant of 
the land under the verdict, thus reversing older cases.79 
But notwithstanding that· juries were hearing evidence as judicial 
bodies, the courts kept on saying that a jury might find the facts of 
its own knowledge. Yet at the same time, the courts were fining 
them for finding contrary to the evidence given in court. The judges 
were hopelessly entangled in the maze of the tiro conflicting theo-
ries, for as against the practice of fining juries, it was urged that for 
an incorrect verdict the attaint lay and that it was a·remedy. The 
courts, as they often have done, tried to ride two horses going in 
exai;tly opposite directions. The fact was that the judges under 
Henry VII and Henry VIII were bewildered in the presence of a 
phenomenon which had taken all the life out of tpe attaint. As long 
as the jury was considered as finding the facts from their own 
n Stat. LI Henry VII, cap. 24; 23 Henry VII, cap. 3; 13 Eliz., cap. 25. 
n Plowd. 292. The case he cites is one in 49 Henry VJ, whcre an abbot, as parson 
of a certain church, held an annuity by prescription in right of his parsonage. He sued 
for it and counted on the annuity as due to him and his predecessor abbots by prescrip-
tion not naming himself as parson. The prescription was travcrsed and he proved an 
annuity by prescription, but not due to him as parson. The jury found for him and was 
attainted. Plowden is wrong. The jury found contrary to the fact alleged, for the abbot 
on the record could have brought another action for the annuity owed to him as parson. 
Even great lawycrs like Plowden are sometimes found slumbering., · 
n According to Plowden, 86, citing 6 and 7 Edward VI, attaint statutes are not 
to be extended by equity of the statute. Contra, Moore, 17, note ·6o, citing the Easter 
term of the 3 Elizabeth. 
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knowledge, the courts were powerless to revise their finding, but 
must use the attaint jury. Perchance, the jury knew much more 
than was spoken in court and only an attaint jury could tell this . 
. But now -stepped in the court of chancery; with its jurisdiction for 
granting a new trial of an action at law. It had no difficulty in act-
ing upon the assumption that the evidence that had been given in 
court was all the evidence that the jury had. At last, in the pres-
ence of this competing jurisdiction, stimulated by the jealousy felt 
both by judges and the common law bar against the equity courts, 
which were stealing so-much of their jurisdiction and emoluments, a 
great light burst upon the common law courts, and, under the Com-
monwealth, they began to grant new trials. But the development had 
been such that the courts, in applying the new trial proceeding, went 
only as far as the equity courts and granted a new trial without sub-
stituting the proper judgment. 
It needs no analysis to show that the passing upon the verdict by 
a motion for a new trial, presupposes that the jury's action is to be 
judged as· if the court had before itseif the evidence given in open 
court and no other, and the rulii:ig is to be made thereby. Granted 
that the jury have acted upon fl:!cts a~d knowledge not disclosed in 
the ·evidence but known to some of them, the motion for a new trial 
be<!omes at once from a logical standpoint an utter absurdity and the 
courts are back where they were under Henry VIII and Henry VII, 
when they were trying to make the practice of attaint cover two ab-
solutely contradictory theQries of a jury's verdict. The attaint per-
ished because too great a work was unthinkingly put upon it. Yet 
such is the persistence of error in repeating the cantilena of the 1aw, 
that Chief Justice Vaughn in his immortal judgment in Bushell's 
case, so which .is one of the bulwarks of our liberties, gave ·as the 
controlling reason why a court could not puni~h a jury for bad judg-
ment ot a perverse verdict without evidence of actual misconduct, 
the wholly absurd reason that the jury found a verdict from their 
own knowledge, as well as from the evidence. Vaughn was still so 
entangled in the two contradictory theories as to assert in one breath 
that a juryman is not a witness because he "swears to what he can 
infer and conclude from the testimony" and in the next breath that 
the law supposes him able to decide the case, although no evidence 
whatever be given, and therefore he is a witness. As a reason-
ing animal, the learned Chief Justice must have come out of "Bed-
lam.'.11 But for. two hundred years this opinion has continued to be 
80 6 State Tr. 99!); Vaughn's Rep. 135. 
11 Thayer in Treat. Evid. 169, speaks of "the keen arguments" in Vaughn's opinion l 
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repeated and today a vast mass of precedent could be cited against 
giving to courts the power upon granting a new trial to enter the 
proper judgment. . 
As soon as it was determined that the jury were a judicial body 
passing upon the evidence given before them in open court, the 
courts began their constmctive work in creating that vast body of 
the rules of evidence, whereby it could be assured that juries would 
be subjected only to the influence of evidence proper for them to 
consider. It is more than a coincidence, it is an hil'!torical necessity, 
that our rules of evidence date from the period when the jury be-
came a judicial body' and the granting of new trials began. 
True it is that the rule as to the sanctity of the written document 
against attack by oral evidence, comes out of the Middle Ages. But" 
this is so because, whether a jury be witnesses or judges, the written 
document must govern the evidence.· Just as when the jury were· 
witnesses making up the verdict from their own knowledge and 
what they could gain by private inquiry, they were guarded against 
improper influences out of court by the strict rules agai1,1st champ-
erty, embracery and maintenance,b2 so after I655~ when they had 
become judges of the evidence, rules were necessary to prevent them 
from being influenced by improper suggestions made in court.· · 
And now to the moral that is to be extracted from this long tale. 
Today the greatest evil in the administration of the law is, first, that 
the judge, during the trial, has not enough control over the jury; 
and, second, after the verdict, has not power to correct it, by enter-
ing the proper verdict and thus ending the litigation with power in 
the Appellate Court to review the ruling and to make the proper 
judgment in the case. If this were possible a great part of the 
appellate jurisdiction, which is taken up with passing upon questions 
of admission and exclusion of evidence and of instructions to juries 
in lower courts, would at once be swept away. Upon this question 
the history of attaint is very instructive. It is the substance of 
things that we must look to, not the form. Once our courts of com-
mon law, by a summary process, could correct a mistake in the find-
ing of a jury and at once substitute the proper finding and judgment 
thereon. This power the common law ought never to have lost, but 
in our progress toward free government, the sanctity of the jury's 
verdict became exaggerated out of all proportion to its merits. '!'he 
12 See 10 Illinois Law Rev. 552, for the reasons for the rules against champerty, 
maintenance and embracery. But it is to be said that the law today punishes any one 
who attempts to talk to or influence a jury out of court, just as it did when the jury 
were witnesses. But under the old rule a party could go to the jury out of court and 
state to them his evidence. In no other way could lie tell the jury his facts. 
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sanctity of the verdict served a great and useful purpose in the strug-
gle for liberty and free institutions, which are more important -than 
any. procedure, but now the day has come when democratic govern-
ment must furnish proof of its right to exist by furnishing justice 
according to law. Aristotle long ago said that governments exist 
for noble deeds, and the noblest and highest duty that the govern-
ment can perform is that of furnishing to its citizens justice that is 
given in accordance with law that is equal for all. It is no answer 
to this demand upon govern.ment to say that ·every litigant has the 
constitutional right in a law case to have a jury make an incorrect 
finding on the issue, that cannot be corrected except by the long and 
.expensive process of a new trial, which again may eventuate in an-
other incorrect finding. It is giving weight enough to the verdict 
for the court to say that it will not set aside the verdict except when 
against the weight of the evid~nce. 
JOHN M. ZANE. 
Chicago, Illinois. 1 
